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ABSTRACT
Arnold, Nathaniel M. M.A. School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University,
2020.
Targeting the Minority: A New Theory of Diversionary Violence.

This research develops a novel theory for domestic diversionary violence, contending that
the main drivers for this type of conflict are the specific characteristics of state-targeted domestic
minority groups. Seven new variables measuring minority group characteristics are identified
through a case study of the Kurdish minority in the Turkish Republic, then applied to a
quantitative analysis of domestic diversionary violence in a dataset of 284 observations across
117 countries during the years 2004-2005, utilizing data from the University of Maryland’s
Minorities at Risk Project, the University of Illinois Cline Center SPEED Database, and World
Bank. A proportional odds logistic regression model shows that the minority group’s recent
grievances with the base population and its geographic concentration have statistically
significant positive correlations to the likelihood of targeting for diversionary violence, while the
protest level of the minority group achieves a statistically significant negative correlation.
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I. Introduction

The resurgence of nationalism and populist regimes across much of the world in recent
years has compelled a return to research on how these governments function and how their
interstate relations differ from other regime types. Concurrently, an increase in the visibility of
violence involving nationalist regimes makes conflict literature involving such states particularly
significant (Schrock-Jacobson 2012; Solt 2011; Shelef 2016; Pillar 2013). While neither
nationalism nor conflict are new paradigms to the study of international relations, recent
publications on the subjects indicate their continued relevance. The cornerstone of diversionary
war theory (DWT) is the unifying potential of militarized conflict and the nationalist sentiment it
evokes. Diversionary violence is therefore a critical field for understanding the mechanics of
nationalism and conflict. How do governments divert popular attention from unpopular domestic
policies? What impact does an economic slowdown have on the likelihood of conflict under a
nationalist regime? Which groups are the most likely targets for diversionary tactics? These
questions are vital, because they have immediate bearing on ongoing crises. The persecution of
the ethnic minority Uighur population in China may be taking place to signal strength to a
domestic audience (Kanat 2016). The violence taking place in eastern Ukraine may divert
attention from economic woes at home in Russia (Bebler 2015).
Diversionary war theory is based on the intuitive concept that some governments use
violence to distract critical bases of support from unpopular domestic conditions. Most
contributions to the body of literature on this subject have focused on the frequency of
diversionary wars within the larger set of militarized interstate disputes and the variables that
determine their outcome. The focus here is on how ethnic minority groups shape domestic
diversionary conflicts by examining the characteristics of targeted groups. A new model is
constructed to evaluate internal state conditions with the goal of determining the circumstances
1

in which domestic groups are most likely to become the target of diversionary violence by state
leadership. This predictive model measures a novel set of variables that inform a state’s decision
to exploit domestic turmoil through diversionary tactics. After the first principles that inform the
hypotheses are defined, the state’s diversionary target selection process is analyzed in the case of
Turkey’s relationship with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) through the 1980s and 1990s to
establish the causal mechanisms impacting the diversionary process. Finally, a quantitative
analysis of domestic diversionary violence is developed based on the identified variables.
The protest level of a minority group, its geographic concentration, and the presence of
recent grievances between it and the state are all novel conditions identified here as having an
impact on a minority group’s likelihood of being targeted by the state. Monitoring these
conditions prior to the onset of domestic diversionary violence may help identify minorities at
risk of being targeted earlier, in turn reducing the risk of violence occurring by providing
international support for the targeted minority group. These crucial insights also provide
direction and greater depth to the existing literature by exploring the impact of these variables
which were previously unaccounted for. They furthermore reveal links between diversionary war
theory and other bodies of social science literature. These new perspectives reframe diversionary
war theory, giving it wider application in diagnosing domestic unrest and paving the way for
future research into diversionary violence.

2

II. Theories of Diversionary War
Traditional diversionary war theory forms the basis of all diversionary war literature. It
argues that states sometimes engage in conflict not only over differences of opinion or strategic
needs, but to distract from internal pressures caused by poor economic performance, ingroup/out-group tensions, low public opinion about regime leadership, or other civil unrest (Levi
1998). Adherents to diversionary war theory contend that popular unrest and economic distress
can incentivize state leadership to engage in a militarized interstate dispute (MID) to divert the
public’s attention and stave off their removal from power (Boulding 1962; Oneal and Tir 2006;
Weeks 2012; Morgan and Anderson 1999). The existential threat from domestic unrest is strong
enough to encourage leaders to pursue international disputes as an alternative to regime change.
Confirming that regimes actually do seek out interstate diversionary wars is difficult, as
several counterarguments exist. A quick look at the prevailing literature reveals a plethora of
dissenting research and a complex discourse regarding DWT’s modern applicability. For
example, it seems intuitive that regimes encourage international conflict to maintain their
popularity domestically, causing a rally around the flag effect, but there has been much
contention about the significance of this effect, and whether ensuing failure might cause a
reciprocal drop in popularity for the state leader, negating any positive impact (Oneal and Brian
1995). There is disagreement over the kinds of domestic problems that lead to diversionary war,
specifically the importance of economic instability (Oneal and Tir 2006). The idea that general
unpopularity incentivizes regimes to pursue diversionary conflict is refuted by Morgan and
Bickers (1992), who contend that dissent from critical groups within a regime’s support coalition
is far more influential on state leaders than general dissent among the populace.
Although the basis for diversionary war theory dates back hundreds of years, its empirical
confirmation has proven elusive. As Gelpi (1997: 257) states, “The lack of any general support
3

for the diversionary hypothesis has led scholars to think about the conditions in which
diversionary conflicts might occur.” For this reason, the contemporary literature on diversionary
war theory has focused on three categories of research: isolating causes of diversionary conflict
(Oneal and Tir 2006; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Powell 2014), determining which types of
regimes are most likely to engage in diversionary violence (Weeks 2012; Kisangani and
Pickering 2009; Kisangani and Pickering 2011; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Pickering and
Kisangani 2010) and building empirical confirmation of the theory (Morgan & Anderson 1999;
Tir 2010; Gibler and Hutchison 2013). Through establishing subcategories for diversionary
conflict, determining what conditions lead to the conflict, and establishing correlation through
empirical analysis, these authors have all attempted to clarify diversionary war theory, amending
the causal mechanisms or variables analyzed in the datasets while maintaining DWT’s theoretical
integrity.

Isolating Causes
DWT relies upon basic assumptions about state interactions and constraints on the
capabilities of state leaders. At its core, the theory posits that states benefit from distracting their
citizenry from domestic or internal problems or crises. This occurs regardless of governmental
system type; both democracies and autocratic governments engage in diversionary wars. Indeed,
much of the early literature on DWT focuses on American involvement in this type of conflict
(Oneal and Bryan 1995).
While the main benefit of diversionary war is to distract from domestic concerns, a
secondary benefit is a surge in the popularity of state leaders, what might be called a bleedover
effect in which state leaders benefit from a sudden surge in nationalist sentiment. These
assumptions have most notably been challenged by Oneal and Bryan (1995), who argue that the
increase in popularity from engaging in a conflict does not outweigh the inevitable unpopularity
4

caused by the damage to the economy by the costly nature of war, and the potential for damage
to the country from counterattacks or international intervention. The theory also assumes that
states that lose an interstate diversionary conflict reap all the costs and few, if any, of the benefits
initially envisioned. The authors also assume state leaders are rational actors seeking the greatest
possible benefit from a conflict, so they will engage in diversionary conflicts with only the
strongest possibility of success, minimizing the risk of failure (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
Hence, in a scenario with multiple potential diversionary conflicts, the risk of war will be greater
for those actors with less powerful militaries than the aggressor state. This increases the
aggressor state’s chance of success. States with low power projection capabilities benefit more
from engaging in regional conflicts or with bordering states, because the cost of engaging in war
increases exponentially with distance from home (Boulding 1962). Control of territory is also
postulated to be a contributing factor to targeting for a diversionary war. If state leadership is
considering instigating a diversionary war, they have a greater likelihood of targeting a state
which holds territory that the aggressor state wishes to reclaim because territorial reclamation
may be a more universally appealing rationale to the public than other reasons for conflict (Tir
2010).

Regime Type
While all governments are capable of pursuing a diversionary conflict, Pickering and
Kisangani (2005: 23) find through analyzing conflicts from 1950 to 1996 that “...[M]ature
democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities are the only regime types prone
to this type of force.” This list appears to include more types of government than it excludes,
reinforcing the idea that this type of conflict can occur anywhere. Kisangani and Pickering
(2011: 1023-24) also draw a distinction between the more benevolent mission of the democratic
regime’s intervention and the hostile, outwardly repressive nature of authoritarian diversionary
5

violence. They argue that democratic regimes are more prone to intervening abroad via
“benevolent military force,” which they define as “socioeconomic intervention” like
humanitarian aid and defending minorities. Autocratic regimes, they contend, are more inclined
to instigate “politicostrategic” military operations without a benevolent or humanitarian mission,
designed, for example, to improve their standing in the regional balance of power. Tir and
Jasinski (2008) contend that diversionary violence is more likely to occur in less developed
states, perhaps because the diversionary in-group outbidding process is more vociferous in less
stable democratic states, though this implication is not discussed at any length.

Empirical Confirmation
Building empirical confirmation through analysis of large data sets has been essential to
the study of diversionary war. Morgan and Anderson (1999) show that in Great Britain between
1950 and 1992, public support for government increased when the state leadership used or
threatened military force abroad. In examining the impact of “competency costs,” or the negative
effects associated with failure to meet policy goals, Gelpi and Grieco (2015) review a data set
containing 769 legislative bills considered by the United States Congress to determine that the
president’s performance during a MID had an impact on their legislative success. This indicates
that for state leadership, meeting wartime objectives is essential to also realizing domestic policy
goals. Oneal and Tir (2006) utilize a data set measuring interstate conflicts from 1921 to 2001 to
confirm that domestic economic deterioration influences a state’s involvement in a diversionary
war, though they are rare. MIDs are correlated to economic instability and domestic political
unrest by Kisangani and Pickering (2009) using generalized method of moments (GMM) models.
Gibler and Hutchison (2013) investigate 369 cases of conflict to show the importance of
territorial dispute in identifying diversionary conflict. To record the correlation between
economic concerns and public opinions on foreign policy priorities, Tir and Singh (2013) use
6

CSES Module II surveys. In order to isolate wars from other conflicts in the data set reviewed,
Powell (2014) sets new parameters for the scale and severity of the conflict. These empirical
studies have shown that economic factors, foreign policy, public opinion, and territorial disputes
affect diversionary war theory. However, all of these studies focus exclusively on evaluating
MIDs.

Domestic Diversionary Theory
Despite significant efforts to establish empirical evidence that diversionary wars do in
fact occur, the results have been inconclusive. Scholars have attempted to reframe the theory in
order to increase the number of cases from which evidence could be drawn, with some success.
Tir and Jasinski’s (2008) groundbreaking work follows Levy’s (1998) conjecture that by
focusing on domestic diversionary conflicts, evidence of diversionary conflict is more prevalent
given that there are fewer risks associated with targeting an ethnic group domestically rather than
another sovereign state. Ethnic groups are the focus of their study because they are assumed to
have strong social ties and kinship that the state leadership may play up as evidence of their
questionable loyalty to the state. As the authors (Tir and Jasinski 2008: 644) state,
Expanding on this idea, we note that because individuals may identify themselves with an
ethnic group as strongly as if not more so than with a state, certain segments of the society
may feel a greater affinity to their own group or even to another state than to the state of
which they are nominally citizens. This means that the embattled leader's constituency
often does not include the entire population of the state; rather, it is limited to a particular
ethnic group or groups. In these cases, we argue, the ethnic minorities outside the in-group
constituency may play the role of enemy outsiders quite effectively.

Their analysis provides a compelling correlation between domestic problems affecting
state leaders and conflicts targeting ethnic minorities. The state pursuing domestic diversionary
violence eschews the likelihood of international intervention on behalf of multi-state institutions
and potentially appears less threatening to bordering states. By targeting an ethnic minority
7

domestically, there is not only lower risk of reprisal (perhaps an existential threat), but also the
potential to create a blame game in which the minority group could be held responsible for
failures originating with the state leader.
The concept stemming from ethnic instrumentalism known as “scapegoating,” (Glaser
1958) has a close connection to domestic diversionary theory. Glaser (1958: 31) defines an
ethnic group as, “…racial, national, or religious groups.” This separates a defined ethnic group
from other related expressions, like ethnic identification or orientation, which refer more
specifically to an individual’s sentiments regarding their ethnic identity. This is a more or less
standard definition for ethnic group, but an important distinction for the purposes of domestic
diversionary theory, where specific ethnic minorities, ethnic “groups,” are the locus of
diversionary violence. Glaser defines scapegoating in a sociological context. Describing the
tendencies of authoritarian personality types, Glaser (1958: 38) states, “…[H]is delusions of
persecution may find expression in scapegoating out-groups, or he may achieve a sense of
security through identification with in-groups.” The author contests that out-groups may be
blamed for problems impacting the in-group, an essential element to the scapegoating concept.
Domestic diversionary theory specifies that conflict is the result of this scapegoating (Tir and
Jasinski 2008), and not simply other less violent forms of repression, though the implications of
this are not considered. Tir and Jasinski (2008) attempt to establish empirical evidence of the
connection between diversionary war and domestic ethnic minorities, arguing that the social
science theory of in-group vs. out-group conflict lends itself more intuitively to domestic
diversionary trends than those involving MIDs. By ostracizing a specific minority group,
especially one involved in lasting, historical domestic tensions, the state leader runs a much
lower risk of international intervention, particularly if the diversionary violence is not a frequent
occurrence.
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Coser (1956) stipulates the advantages of in-group vs. out-group conflict in a sociological
context, but the basic concept of a contest between in-group bidders competing for control over
the out-group scapegoating narrative is foundational to domestic diversionary theory. As ingroup factions competing for power in the state system see state leadership’s rhetoric and
antiminority narrative, they compete to top each other’s prejudicial actions in order to signal to
state leadership that they are supportive of the scapegoating action. This snowballs into a
diversionary narrative that shifts the blame for unpopular domestic issues to the out-group
(Devotta 2005).
Domestic diversionary theory represents an intriguing and innovative approach to some
common themes within the existing diversionary literature. It connects the social science
constructs of in-group/out-group conflict and in-group political outbidding with established
theories on ethnic minority identity and domestic political constraints to create a cohesive,
intuitive narrative for diversionary state actions (Devotta 2005; Cederman 2015; Lawoti 2007;
Gagnon 1995). Domestic diversionary theory is the jumping-off point for this article, as I
construct “domestic diversionary target selection theory,” which extrapolates from the existing
traditions of the diversionary literature to determine which conditions within a minority group
determine its likelihood of being marginalized as an out-group and targeted for diversionary
violence.

Domestic Diversionary Target Selection Theory
Domestic diversionary target selection theory (DDTS) follows the same straightforward
causal logic as traditional diversionary war theory—state leadership begins to lose popularity in
critical bases of support due to economic duress or unpopular domestic policy. Being the rational
political utility maximizers that state leaders are, they counter this drop in popularity and any
removal from power that may result by constructing a narrative in which a domestic minority
9

becomes the scapegoat, blamed for the wider problems that the state is facing. By targeting a
group perceived as outside or different from the base population, the state leader not only
deflects the majority’s discontent but also identifies a common adversary for the majority group.
The surge in nationalism that results acts as a buoy for state leader popularity while unifying the
base. Any expense accrued as the result of this conflict can actually help the state leadership’s
narrative, as the conflict can be construed as the minority’s fault, and the expense just more fuel
to the fire of nationalism. Any casualties in the base population can similarly benefit state
leadership by confirming that the targeted minority was indeed a threat. Constraints exist, of
course—the state leadership must be careful not to instigate a conflict with a minority group
powerful enough to overwhelm state military capabilities and mire the state in a more serious
conflict, for example.
At this point, however, DDTS departs from the existing diversionary theories in a number
of important ways. Where Pickering and Kisangani (2005), Levy (1998), and Tir and Jasinski
(2008) have primarily focused on the international conditions, regime characteristics, and
domestic economic situation most conducive to diversionary violence occurring, DDTS instead
takes the novel approach of focusing exclusively on the minority group characteristics that
increase its likelihood of being targeted by the state. In cases where a “minority at risk (MAR)”
as classified in the Minorities at Risk Database (Minorities at Risk Project 2009) is present
within a state, it can be assumed that the minority would not be at risk unless the state did not
have the capability to use repressive or violent tactics against the minority group. This falls in
line with the Minorities at Risk Project (2007:1) definition of a MAR as, “An ethnopolitical
group that: collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis
other groups in a society; and/or collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its selfdefined interests.” The data provided by the Minorities at Risk Project (2009) has furthermore
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been successfully used in the diversionary literature (Tir and Jasinski 2008) as it allows the
direction of the violence between a state and a minority group to be identified.
In the case of multiple minority groups present in a state, I argue that given the state has
the ability to instigate a domestic diversion, this violence can be used against any minority group
classified as “at risk” within the state. The state’s capabilities and characteristics are thus
designated the preconditions of diversionary violence, not those of the minority groups on the
receiving end of this violence. In other words, for the state to have domestic diversionary tactics
in its wheelhouse, it must already have crossed a threshold for repressive or military capabilities.
These instigating state characteristics have preoccupied the existing literature for decades,
and perhaps as a consequence of this, these theories have yielded little conclusive, quantitative
support for diversionary theories. Tir and Jasinski (2008: 642) admit the quantitative limitations
of traditional diversionary war theory were a motivating factor in establishing domestic
diversionary theory. The authors (Tir and Jasinski 2008: 656-58) attempt to examine the impact
of several variables on the occurrence of domestic diversionary violence, including minority
group ethnic ties to neighboring states, minority group size relative to the base population,
government military capability, political discrimination, economic development at the state level,
the presence of oncoming elections, an armed conflict occurring simultaneously, and others.
While they devote some attention to the targeting process, their variable analysis is focused on
establishing initial evidence for the presence of this type of conflict and determining its
preconditions—they emphasize the state’s capabilities and characteristics. However, if all states
deploying diversionary tactics must present these characteristics for the tactics to be labeled
“diversionary,” then in a state system with multiple minority groups present, it is the minority
group’s characteristics that determine its likelihood of being targeted, not the state’s capabilities
(which would already be present for the diversion to occur). Therefore, this article establishes
these variables as the assumptions that are the backbone of DDTS theory.
11

It is logical that as the first and effectively only published work in the field of domestic
diversionary conflict, Tir and Jasinski (2008) would focus on rooting the theory to some extent
in the causal mechanisms identified in the traditional diversionary war literature. But the lack of
compelling evidence in the diversionary literature has encouraged me to depart from this
tradition when constructing DDTS theory. Instead of building variables based on the same
mechanisms present in traditional diversionary war theory or domestic diversionary theory,
DDTS theory establishes first principles and assumptions about state behavior in a diversionary
scenario, then applies these to an analysis of an established instance of domestic diversionary
conflict. This permits variables to be operationalized organically from the critical concepts
observed in this case study. This will allow for a new visualization of what factors are, from a
practical perspective, essential to the diversionary process.
Finally, DDTS theory differs from the existing literature in that it attempts to construct a
model for why specific minority groups are chosen as targets for diversionary violence over
others. Where Tir and Jasinski’s (2008) domestic diversionary theory includes numerous
independent variables depicting state behavior and minority group behavior, drawing some
secondary conclusions about the concepts that impact targeting, DDTS theory controls for state
behavior and conditions, instead measuring minority group behavior and characteristics. This
allows for a detailed analysis of the differences between multiple minority groups within one
state system, depicting which characteristics correlate with increased likelihood of diversionary
targeting. Though the first principles and assumptions of this theory are rooted in the
diversionary literature, operationalization of concepts in DDTS theory can only occur after a
thorough case study.
Foremost in these assumptions is that state leaders are rational actors. The rationality and
inherent self-interest of individuals and states is not only a well-known and essential assumption
in the international relations theory of rationalism but also a critical component to the logic of
12

diversionary war theory. If state leaders are rational, self-interested actors, they can be expected
to keep diversionary tactics in their wheelhouse of repressive strategies to maintain their hold on
power. Following from this precept, several assumptions about the behavior of states can be
made, increasing the predictability of state actions within the diversionary theory. Though the
causes for domestic diversionary violence are as varied as the countries pursuing them,
ultimately all violence that can be classified as “diversionary” occurs when a state’s economy is
underperforming, and civil unrest is occurring within the base voter group. These factors, along
with the other three described below, are preconditions for diversionary violence occurring at all,
and are thus assumptions within DDTS theory; [1] rationality of state actors, [2] regime type, [3]
military capabilities, [4] economic underperformance, and [5] political unrest are all assumed to
be present in this type of conflict.

Rationality of State Actors
An essential tenet of not just DWT but rationalism at large is that state actors are rational
and self-interested—they will always, rationally, act in their own self-interest. There is consensus
in much of the literature around this idea; Tir and Jasinski (2008: 647) state:

Moreover, the leader who wants to enhance the chances of his/her political survival
cannot select just any ethnic group to serve as the target of a domestic diversionary attack.
The selection instead has to be made carefully, as the leader's survival may in part depend
on the support from one or more minority groups. The most opportune targets would
arguably be the politically and/or economically marginalized groups with a history of
antagonism vis-a-vis other groups found within the country. Such groups are referred to
by Gurr (2000) as "minorities at risk" (MARs). These groups have relatively little ability
to fight back either by intra or extra-constitutional means; moreover, their plight in the
face of diversion against them is unlikely to generate sympathy among the other groups,
let alone willingness to help them.
Here the authors point out not only that target selection is a conscious decision by the state
leader, but also that several constraints impact the selection process. These constraints are taken
into account in DDTS based on the logic laid out here, but the important concept behind this
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assumption is that target selection is a conscious process, in which state leadership weighs the
advantages and disadvantages associated with diversionary tactics against each available target.
The state leader, with the purpose of maximizing the political utility from this process, thus
logically determines the state’s military capabilities, the depth of the economic situation’s impact
on the leader’s popularity, and the capabilities and political utility of various minority
populations. This information informs their target selection—the group with limited military
capabilities and international support, high levels of political marginalization, historical
grievances with the majority population, and which is most efficient (because of geographic
concentration or population size) to project militarized violence against. If state leadership are
rational political utility maximizers, it can be assumed that they have already determined that
diversionary tactics are viable before attempting them. Therefore, it can be assumed that the state
has already evaluated its capabilities, and the determinants for diversionary violence are instead
to be found in the composition and maneuvers of the targeted minority groups. In determining
which minority groups are most at risk of targeting, the diversionary and ethnic conflict literature
has frequently (Fox 2000; Gurr 2000; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003) relied on the Minorities at
Risk Project (2009) for data and the definition of a MAR.
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Regime Type
As discussed in Pickering and Kisangani (2005), almost all regime types are subject to
diversionary conflicts. Weeks (2012) argues that authoritarian regimes are influenced by elite
groups which hold the economic reigns within a state. Authoritarian regimes engaging in
diversionary tactics attempt to increase support from elite groups, whereas democratic
diversionary attempts focus on garnering support from the base voter group. Whether a regime is
more authoritarian or more democratic, almost all attempt diversionary tactics, though an
authoritarian state may have more latitude to use extreme repressive methods against a domestic
minority than a democratic regime. Therefore, both authoritarian regimes and democracies will
be included in this analysis because both are capable of using diversionary tactics. Determining
whether authoritarian diversionary violence is designed to assuage an elite audience as opposed
to the base voter group like in a democratic regime is beyond the bounds of the research here, as
the determinants of domestic diversionary target selection theory must be determined first. As
state leaders are assumed to be rational political utility maximizers, regardless of the audience
from which they are attempting to elicit greater support, they will choose the most logical target.

Military Capabilities
States, by definition, hold a monopoly on the use of violence in a country. If a minority
group has the military capability to present an existential threat to the state, then the state no
longer has a monopoly on violence and the nation in question is a failed state. If a minority group
with substantial military capabilities such as the ability to maintain a militia or access to
equipment which restricts the state’s ability for military response were to be targeted by the state,
more widespread conflict than what is ideal for diversionary purposes would result. Conflicts in
which minority groups with these capabilities are targeted are therefore not representative of
diversionary conflicts; they can decide the fate of the state as a whole and are classified as civil
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wars or separatist conflicts. Furthermore, if a conflict were to take place between more evenly
matched state military forces and minority group militias, for example the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Tamil rebels against the Sri Lankan military (Devotta 2005), the
likelihood of escalation in the conflict to a full-blown civil war indicates that the minority group
would not be “at risk” of diversionary targeting by the state. Targeting a minority group with the
military capabilities of the Tamils would only happen under the direst of circumstances. For the
purposes of this article, any civil war-scale events as identified in the Minorities at Risk Project
(2009) and Correlates of War (COW) Dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) are excluded in the
final analysis to ensure that only domestic diversionary violence is measured. The state leader
would thus only target a minority group with sufficiently limited military capabilities to ensure
that a wider, existential conflict is not the likely result. Essentially, because state leaders are
assumed to be rational actors, the minority at risk of being targeted would not be at risk unless
the state has a preponderance of force to use against them.
Although the Minorities at Risk Project (2007) definition of an “at risk” minority assures
that each minority involved in the database is discriminated against in some way and is at risk of
further persecution, it does not address the issue of state military power relative to the minority
group. If a state leader could call on an army of several million for a domestic diversionary
attempt against a minority group with a militia of only a few thousand, clearly the state has the
military capability to target that minority group. However, if a minority group could field half a
million soldiers, the opportunity cost for state leadership may be too high to justify the
diversionary attempt. The Minorities at Risk Project (2009) provides data on the total population
of the country in which the minority group is found as well as the total population of the
minority group in a specific country, but it does not provide information on state or minority
group military capabilities. As a result, for the purposes of this article, military capabilities for
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the aggressor state and the minority group targeted are approximated based on their total
population size.
While it seems intuitive that state military capability relative to the minority would have a
major impact on the likelihood of a minority group being targeted for diversionary violence,
there is more nuance to the argument than is initially apparent. State military size relative to the
minority group does not account for how dispersed or preoccupied the state military is. If state
leadership is enduring national economic hardship and nationwide popular unrest, they may be
reticent to deploy a large percentage of their forces, which could otherwise be used to repress
protests and maintain order in the base population, to engage in a diversionary attack.
Furthermore, traditional measures of military capability do not necessarily translate for domestic
diversions. When engaging in domestic diversionary violence, the drawback for state leadership
is that they target domestic assets. Airstrikes are therefore less appealing when roads and other
critical infrastructure are the targets, particularly when the state is already facing an economic
downturn. In other words, on paper the state may have military capabilities which provide an
inaccurate representation of the state’s available assets for a domestic diversionary attempt.
DDTS theory therefore assumes that for diversionary violence to take place, the state already
holds a preponderance of military power relative to the minority.

Economic Volatility and Underperformance
Economic instability or underperformance is a precondition for diversionary violence
occurring. There can be many causes for economic instability. The state might be facing
economic sanctions which restrict its import/export capabilities or cause unsustainable inflation.
If the economy is resource-driven, the threat of a cut to production or a sudden downturn in the
export of essential resources could impact revenue streams, as was the case with Russian natural
gas exports prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian natural gas exports flow through
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much of Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula, which may have precipitated the Russian
incursion into Ukrainian territory (Bebler 2015). Furthermore, a state experiencing an economic
downturn might target a minority group which has access to resource-rich territory, as the
Chinese have cracked down on the minority Uighur population in Xinjiang Province (Blackwill
2016). The state could blame the minority group for causing the economic downturn, perhaps to
destabilize the government and gain more autonomy. In democratic states, the popularity of the
government is often inextricably linked with economic performance. Tir and Singh (2013)
identified a correlation between economic downturns and public opinion about aggressive state
foreign policy. If there is an economic downturn, the government will be the first blamed for lost
jobs and lowered access to consumer goods. It is intuitive that a state leader facing impending
removal due to an economic crisis would target a minority group, diverting popular unrest away
from their job performance or policies. DDTS assumes that the state engaging in diversionary
violence is already experiencing widespread economic problems.

Political or Civil Unrest
A central feature of diversionary war theory is the presence of popular unrest—this is
indeed the mechanism that encourages the state to divert the public’s attention in an attempt to
allay its loss of popularity. In most if not all diversionary war literature, economic
underperformance and civil unrest are considered preconditions for diversionary attempts to
occur (Oneal and Tir 2006; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Powell 2014). It is therefore an
assumption in this paper that for a diversionary attack to occur, popular protest or other forms of
unrest have been occurring. The state leader, facing unrest and unpopularity amongst a critical
support group is motivated to build a narrative in which a domestic minority group is the cause
of that critical group’s troubles, thus diverting their attentions away from the state leader’s
imminent discomfiture and toward a potentially blameless minority group.
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Although these five assumptions will always be present in diversionary violence
according to DDTS theory, the individual characteristics of minority groups that make them
more attractive targets for diversionary violence are still very much in question. While Tir and
Jasinski (2008) analyze a number of variables that could impact a minority group’s likelihood of
being targeted, the assertion here that all diversionary violence is based exclusively on the
characteristics of the minority group opens the door for an analysis of a wider selection of
variables which impact a minority group’s relationship with the state. However, the novelty of
this research requires a point of reference from which to establish which concepts potentially
impact the DDTS theory.

III. Case Study: The Kurdish Question: Çiller and Diversionary Violence
Its assumptions and causal logic having been established, it is now prudent to examine a
case that is recognized by many scholars as an example of a domestic diversionary conflict to
determine the concepts which seem to impact the diversionary model. The dimensions of these
concepts can then be operationalized for a quantitative analysis of a large set of cases to
determine the relevance of DDTS in the diversionary literature. Tir and Jasinski (2008: 652)
point out the evident diversionary component to the Turkish conflict against the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) and repressive, violent tactics against the Kurdish people in Turkey at
large. Contributions to the peace and conflict literature have examined the rationale and domestic
popularity requirements of Turkish state leaders in the context of the “Kurdish Question” (Brown
1995; Entessar 2009; Hashimoto and Bezci 2016; Muller 1996; Olson 1996; Nigogosian 1996).
The preponderance of research done on this troubled relationship allows a unique opportunity to
determine the causal mechanisms present in the conflict from multiple sources, establishing with
some authority the diversionary concepts which demand further consideration in the quantitative
analysis to come.
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Domestic diversionary conflicts are notoriously difficult to study because state leaders as
rational political utility maximizers are unlikely to see the benefit in revealing such a cynical
motive for warfare and perhaps reduce their popularity further. To deal with this problem,
proponents of the diversionary literature index the number of incidents of popular unrest to
depict government unpopularity and combine this with measures of domestic economic
performance (Tir and Jasinski 2008: 648). This reflects the emphasis that the literature has
placed on determining the preconditions for diversionary wars to take place, as well as the focus
on quantitative analysis. However, it is also essential to examine the causal chain that leads to a
domestic diversionary conflict. The relationship between the Turkish state and its Kurdish ethnic
minority reveals how domestic diversionary conflicts develop, while showing the causal linkages
between the variables identified to the likelihood of targeting for diversionary violence.

Minorities in the Turkish State
Ethnonationalism in many ways defined the development of the modern Turkish
Republic. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire opened the door for independent states to form
around ethnonationalist identity. In the Kemalist Turkish Republic, the population was united
around the idea of a national home for the Turkish people. Many of the minority groups present
within the boundaries of this new republic identified as very much not Turkish. The Caucasian
minorities, including the 50,000 Armenian, 75,000 Azeri, 1 million Circassian, 90,000 Georgian,
and 150,000 Laz people, have failed to gain any state recognition of their unique cultural and
linguistic identities. The Assyrian and Greek Christian minorities have almost completely
disappeared from Turkey as a result of Turkification policies since 1924—many Assyrians have
joined the western European diaspora, and many Greeks returned to Greece (Karimova and
Deverell 2001: 9-16). Around 2 percent (1.6 million people) in Turkey are Arabic-speaking—
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most are settled in Hatay Province, on the Syrian border (Karimova and Deverell 2001: 22; Koç
2008: 448).
Upon the fall of the Ottoman Empire and creation of the Turkish Republic, the
reconceptualization of Turkish national identity called for a “homeland for the ethnic Turkish
and Kurdish peoples.” Turkish officials have insisted on referring to Kurds as “mountain Turks,”
implying that there was little to differentiate them from the Turkish national identity at large
(Brown 1995: 117; Gürbey 1996: 13). In 1924, the Treaty of Lausanne removed recognition of
cultural, religious, and linguistic minority groups in the Turkish Republic. This Turkification has
had a powerful repressive effect on minority rights in Turkey. As Muller (1996: 175) explains,
“In one stroke, the Kurdish people lost their right to exist as a recognizable and distinct people
and became incorporated into the Turkish nation by virtue of their Muslim heritage.”
Minority groups in Turkey represent a substantial portion of the Turkish population.
Caucasian minorities comprise an estimated 2 million people in Turkey. The Kurds, with a
population between 18 and 20 million, represent at least one-fifth of the total Turkish population
(Gunter 2004: 198; CIA World Factbook 2020; Karimova and Deverell 2001: 8-9; Yapp and
Dewdney 2020). The Alevis, though they have some crossover between Kurdish, Turkish, and
Arab populations in Turkey, represent 15-20 percent of the Turkish state (Karimova and Deverell
2001: 8-9; Yapp and Dewdney 2020). Despite riots and protests against the Turkish state in the
mid-1990s by Alevi groups, which resulted in substantial casualties, there have been no
substantial military actions taken against their population (Nigogosian 1996: 45). In contrast, the
Kurds have experienced decades of coordinated military offensives and crackdowns in the 11
provinces of southeast Turkey. Other proponents of diversionary theory have argued that the
population size of the minority group targeted by the state will be relatively small to prevent the
chance of reprisals. However, the history of the Turkish-Kurdish relationship appears to
contradict this logic, as the Kurds have been consistently targeted by state leadership for decades.
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Where other minority groups have faced similar cultural repression to the Kurds, none have been
targeted for such wholesale military operations.
Similar characteristics are present to some extent for each minority described above. The
Alevis have substantial kinship with groups in neighboring states, such as Syria. The Caucasian
minority groups of course also had substantial foreign national support and kinship support due
to their proximity. Groups such as the Alevis and Armenians have staged significant protests and
riots against the Turkish state. Yet, none of these groups have been targeted to the extent that the
Kurds have. A deeper analysis of Turkish-Kurdish relations below will lay out the circumstances
that have led to their targeting during a particularly contentious period in Turkish history.

Economic Discrimination and Kinship Groups
Economic discrimination directed toward the Kurds has arguably occurred since before
the formation of the Turkish Republic, as regions with heavy Kurdish concentrations in Anatolia
and Turkey’s southeast—rugged, mountainous, arid regions—have always been scarce on
resources and thus unattractive areas for investment. However, this traditional neglect became
more pronounced in the wake of the 1980 coup d’état, which specifically targeted left-wing
political parties, Turkish, Kurdish, or otherwise. Moving forward the Kurds had little
representation in the Turkish political system throughout the 1980s, and thus very few advocates.
Economic growth in the southeast slowed with the absence of political advocacy at the
national level, as well as the deliberate repression of Kurdish political and cultural identity
through Turkey’s legal system in the form of the 1991 “Anti-Terror Act” which, among other
things, provided legal backing for the continued enforcement of a militarized police state in the
southeast and the destruction of over 2 thousand Kurdish villages (Muller 1996: 182). This
exacerbated the already noticeable disparity in the development between Turkish population
centers and Kurdish regional bases. Though there were no specific state-level economic policies
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designed to favor the majority over Kurdish populations, the systematic elimination of Kurdish
villages and the displacement of some 2 million Kurdish civilians were an effective deterrent to
economic development (Muller 1996: 182).
Between 1990 and 2006 there were dozens of domestic incidents involving Kurdish
protesters and security forces (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The scale and severity of these
protests has varied, but the Kurdish diaspora in Europe has had the interesting effect of allowing
for widespread protests against the Turkish state to occur in Turkish embassies, consulates, and
businesses worldwide. In Oslo, around thirty ethnic Kurds occupied a Turkish Airlines office to
protest Turkish security forces on March 6, 1991. In Paris, a demonstration about the poor
treatment of Kurds in Turkey drew several hundred Kurdish demonstrators on August 25, 1992.
On March 24, 1993, in several European cities including Marseille, Munich, Copenhagen and
others, Kurdish militants took hostages at Turkish consulates (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).
Though these events represent a smaller scale of protest and resistance than those occurring
within Turkey, they have drawn significant international attention in the past, with news agencies
like the BBC and Agence France Presse reporting on Kurdish protests (Minorities at Risk
Project 2009). The Kurdish minority’s size is an asset that other minority groups do not have in
such abundance—immigrant populations in Western Europe and North America can utilize civic
action channels to push governments to encourage reform of Turkish policies. Though it is
outside the bounds of this paper to quantify the impact that international protests have on
domestic policy reform within Turkey, it is plausible that they helped shape the narrative outside
Turkey about the Kurdish plight and drew public attention in the United States and Europe to the
Turkish security forces’ treatment of Kurds (Brown 1995: 124).
Kindred groups that share a border with Turkey also have a significant impact on its
Kurdish policy. In response to growing Kurdish strength across the border in Iraq after the
Persian Gulf War, the Özal administration attempted a ceasefire with the PKK in order to allow
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for the celebration of Newroz and a lifting of the Kurdish language ban. Though the Çiller
administration walked back many of the reforms of the Özal era, increased Kurdish strength in
Iraq undoubtedly had an impact on Turkish relations with its own Kurdish population. Thus,
kindred group support, non-state foreign support, and foreign state support are all important
factors in the Turkish state-Kurdish minority relationship.

Turkish-Kurdish Relations from 1923-1992
The 1924 Treaty of Lausanne was followed by a series of Kurdish uprisings between
1925-1938. The Turkish military, keenly aware that the steady secession of minority groups from
the Ottoman Empire acted as a catalyst to its downfall, brutally quashed these Kurdish revolts,
denying the revolutionaries their goal of an independent state. No organized Kurdish resistance
of note took place until the 1970s.
In 1978, in the Kurdish village of Fis, Abdullah “Apo” Ocalan and a group of
like-minded Marxist-Leninist Kurdish nationalists established the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane,
also known as the “Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK).” The group sought to build support for an
independent Kurdish republic in southeastern Turkey, but their efforts often led to casualties as
civilians found themselves in the crosshairs. Through “Viet Cong-style terror tactics,” (Brown
1995: 118) the PKK used fear and violence to garner support, voluntary or otherwise, from the
surrounding areas. By the early 1980s, 15,000 militants were estimated to be active within the
PKK. In August 1984, PKK “Kurdistan Freedom Brigades” attacked strategic locations
throughout the Kurdish regions, including the cities Erduh and Sundinli (Brown 1995: 118).
These attacks were meant to demonstrate PKK resolve to Turkish forces and encourage the
Turkish government to rescind bans on the use of Kurdish language and the practice of Kurdish
cultural traditions, including the celebration of Newroz, the Kurdish New Year. Indirectly, this
offensive was meant to increase Kurdish support for their own independent state. The 1984
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offensive was just the precursor to a seven-year period of attacks that were part of the PKK
strategy of “revolutionary violence,” in which Turkish military and government forces,
dissenting Kurds and others were targeted to further PKK goals (Gürbey 1996: 23).
The impact of the PKK on the Kurdish population of Turkey at large is difficult to
overstate. Though he faced a state investigation for its publication, Doğu Ergil’s article The
Southeast Report outlined the sentiment and allegiance of Kurds from many regional bases,
including Diyarbakir, Batman, Mardin, Adana, Mersin, and Antalya and indicates how
widespread anti-Turkish sentiment had become over the eleven years since the violence of 1984.
Ergil’s findings suggested that amongst the sample of Kurdish individuals interviewed, 35
percent were close to someone in the PKK and 77 percent thought the Turkish military could not
defeat them. On the question of whether the respondent supported PKK actions, 65 percent chose
not to answer, but 47 percent of those who did respond supported PKK actions. 88 percent of
respondents wished to see structural changes to the political system in Turkey (Nigogosian 1996:
45).” These numbers underscore how inextricable the PKK were from the Kurdish population at
large and how any large-scale operation against the Kurds would necessarily be catastrophic to
the Kurdish civilian population as well. Any diversionary elements present in the Turkish
offensives against the PKK therefore also target the Kurdish minority group as a whole.
The ‘80s were marked by the anti-Kurdish policies of Turkey’s Motherland Party, with
party founder Turgut Özal as prime minister from 1983-1987, Ali Bozer for 10 days in 1989,
Yildirim Akbulut from 1989-1991, under the presidency of Kenan Evren followed by the
ascension of Turgut Özal. Repression of human rights in Kurdish districts and forward
deployment of an impressive 260,000 Turkish troops in Kurdish territory underscored the
Turkish leadership’s disinterest in negotiation during this period. Though PKK tactics to force
Kurdish civilian support for the movement may have been inhumane, Turkish efforts to curb this
support were often brutal and oppressive, with an estimated 200,000 deaths since 1985
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(Nigogosian 1996: 44) and over 2,000,000 civilians displaced since the beginning of the first
insurgency in 1984 (Muller 1996: 182). Beyond the staggering figures, Turkish state tactics used
to limit support for these policies included limiting freedom of speech and expression, indefinite
detention of journalists and activists, and torture (Nigogosian 1996: 45; Muller 1996: 182).

The Özal Era
The early ‘90s were a period of marked change in Turkish policy toward the Kurds,
challenging the doleful Kurdish proverb that states, “The Kurds have no friends but the
mountains (Hashimoto and Bezci 2016: 640).” The administration change from the neoliberal
Motherland Party in favor of the social conservative True Path Party (predecessor of Erdogan’s
current AKP), concurrent with the geopolitical upheaval of the Persian Gulf War led to a change
in policy toward the Kurds. The ousting of the Iraqi army from Kuwait and Saddam Hussein’s
consequent weakened influence in the region meant the potential for the Iraqi Kurds to achieve,
at the very least, a greater level of autonomy in northern Iraq. True Path Party leadership saw an
opportunity to appeal to this faction by resolving the conflict with its own Kurdish population,
lessening the chance that Turkish Kurds would attempt to form a geographically and culturally
unified system with their cross-border cousins. As Brown (1996: 120) explains, “If Turkey could
successfully move to settle its own Kurdish problem, then the Iraqi Kurds might begin to see
Turkey as a protector instead of an enemy.” Turkish state leadership began to make moves
toward reconciliation, with Özal announcing an end to the ban of Kurdish music in February
1991. However, any goodwill generated from this reform was effectively squandered when
Kurds from the Iraqi Kurdistan region, in an effort to improve relations with Turkey, agreed to
prevent PKK forces in Iraq from using their territory to launch insurgent attacks into Turkey
(Olson 1992). The PKK responded by cutting supply lines from Turkey to Northern Iraq, leading
to a joint Peshmerga-Turkish military offensive in October 1992 against PKK positions in
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Northern Iraq. Casualty reports from this conflict are contentious, but PKK strength across the
region was damaged to some extent as a result (Gunter 1996: 55; BBC News 2007).
In 1993, Öcalan declared a “unilateral and unconditional ceasefire (Entessar 2009: 142).”
Years of airstrikes and commando raids by Turkish security forces throughout the 1980s and
early ‘90s had weakened the PKK (Olson 1992: 489-92). In 1992, hostilities between the PKK
and Masoud Barzani’s Iraqi “Kurdistan Democratic Party” (KDP) had further weakened the
PKK. Finally, Öcalan may have seen the ceasefire as an opportunity to consolidate power in the
midst of infighting between the KDP and Jalal Talabani’s Iraqi “Patriotic Union of Kurdistan”
(PUK), particularly in the wake of Operation Northern Iraq (Gunter 1996: 50-5). Whatever the
cause, 1993 proved a pivotal year in the resolution of the “Kurdish Question.” This change of
tactics for the PKK embodied the growing ownership of ethnonationalist identity within the
Turkey’s Kurdish community and a more unified approach to achieving the goals of the Kurdish
people at large. Öcalan’s statements were met by President Özal’s announcement that proKurdish reforms could begin, but the Turkish government carried on with military operations
against the PKK despite the ceasefire. Özal’s death in April 1993 was followed by a renewal of
PKK violence in May 1993 with a PKK assault that killed 33 Turkish conscripts as a response to
the government’s failure to comply to the ceasefire (Brown 1995: 122).

The Çiller Administration
The death of Özal and the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War marked another change in
Turkish policy regarding the “Kurdish Question.” In 1993, Tansu Çiller, first female prime
minister of Turkey, took control of government. As leader of the “True Path Party” (Doğru Yol
Partisi, DYP), a neoliberal, socially conservative organization, Çiller’s policies initially had a
heavy focus on economic reforms. However, these neoliberal economic policies were
confounded by a capital and equity redistribution scheme rendered necessary by the coalition
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formed by the DYP and the social democrat SHP Party. Having spent many years in the United
States attaining a Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut, American politics and norms had an
influence on Çiller’s policy making. As Sakallıoğlu (2002: 200) explains,
The third major influence on the formation of Çiller’s essential qualities was her
favorable view of American society and economy. When she first emerged on the
political stage in Turkey, there were speculations that her pro-Americanism helped her
win the sympathy and support of the U.S. government.”
Perhaps because of this American connection, Çiller was initially disposed to uphold the Özal
imperative, bringing the PKK to the negotiation table, particularly given the context of the
Persian Gulf War and the new strategic interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey’s
Kurdish neighbors in northern Iraq. As the economic situation degraded into a full-blown
recession in Turkey and facing popular unrest in non-Kurdish regions, Çiller conceded to the
ongoing pressures of the military and conservatives within her own party, widening the conflict
against the PKK (Brown 1995: 123; Sakallıoğlu 2002: 203).
The increased Turkish military presence in Kurdish territory and offensives against the
PKK during the Çiller era generated a rally around the flag effect for her administration and put
the PKK on the back foot, though continued economic pressures ensured this was short lived. As
Brown (1995: 123) explains, “…Turkish nationalist sentiment began to rise as the conflict in the
southeast became even bloodier.” Writing in 1995, Nigogosian (44) pointed out, “The array of
forces rallying around Prime Minister Çiller for the forthcoming elections will most likely press
with even more vigor to eradicate the Kurdish nationalist movement led by the PKK.” Though
Çiller did not achieve reelection, there is an identifiable trend toward increased nationalism and
nativism as a result of Çiller’s widening of the conflict against the Kurds from 1993 onwards, as
seen in the prosecution of seven members of Turkish Parliament who had made supposed proPKK comments. Though members of Turkish Parliament (MPs) were traditionally immune from
prosecution, this immunity was lifted in early March 1994, and all seven MPs received prison
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sentences between three and fifteen years (Brown 1995: 123-4). This imprisonment and the
alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated by Turkish security forces during this period caused
substantial international outcry and even pushed the United States to impose conditions on 10%
of its military aid to Turkey and Germany to completely revoke its aid, though this decision was
later reversed (Brown 1995: 124). This international consensus went against the desires of a
hefty contingent of the Turkish population, which wished for continued conflict against the PKK,
with which it considered itself to be in “all-out war (Brown 1995: 125).” The Turkish offensive
against the Kurds was enormously expensive and acted as a drag on the Turkish economy. In
1995 alone, approximately $8 billion was spent fighting the conflict, around 20 percent of the
national budget (Brown 1995: 123; Nigogosian 1996: 44; Sakallıoğlu 2002: 202). Compounded
by perhaps the direst economic situation the Turkish Republic had experienced since the coup
d’état and institution of martial law in 1980, Çiller faced the unenviable position of choosing
between improving the economy and international relations with essential allies or increasing
domestic popularity with her voter base and the military elite through continued conflict against
the embattled PKK. Despite Öcalan’s evident desire to come to the negotiation table and reach a
ceasefire agreement, the Çiller administration continued to persecute the war against the PKK
and accrue substantial Kurdish civilian casualties as an inevitable result. In this case, economic
and social pressures led to the state leadership’s decision to expand and pursue conflict against a
minority group which had neither the strength nor support to represent an existential threat to the
state. The result of this conflict was increased popularity, a rally around the flag effect for the
Çiller administration.

The Kurdish Question in Turkey overflowed into other critical dyads of the Çiller foreign
policy era. As the conflict escalated in 1995, two former Turkish MPs of Kurdish heritage
approached Russian Federation government officials in an attempt to establish a Kurdish
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Parliament in Exile (KPE). Turkish officials put a quick end to this only a week later by meeting
in Moscow with Russian officials to sign the “Protocol to Prevent Terrorism,” which among
other resolutions refused to recognize the PKK as a legitimate institution. This tacit agreement to
not support any pro-Kurdish institution within Russia expanded over the next month into a wider
pragmatic agreement between the two states, as Russia’s agreement to not support any Kurdish
nationalist movement within its borders was met by Turkish support for the ongoing war in
Chechnya and eventually an acquiescence to increased Russian economic influence over the
Caucasus (Olson 1996: 96-7). After all, Boris Yeltsin was in the midst of a bloody conflict
against a minority group of his own at the time. This immediate Turkish response to the informal
Kurdish visit to Moscow shows that although international political response to the Turkish
offensives against Kurds was not enough to halt the conflict, an established kinship group with
political power and the ear of a perhaps pliable foreign government was threat enough to warrant
a direct response and countermeasure on the part of the Turkish government.

The Çiller administration arguably squandered any rally around the flag effect that
resulted from the widening of the conflict with the PKK—the conflict was something of a selffulfilling prophecy as it deepened the Turkish economic crisis even further, thus making a wash
of any popularity the Çiller administration may have gained. However, the outcome of a
diversionary conflict does not determine its existence. Historical grievances in the form of a
bloody and ongoing conflict with an ethnic minority added to the brutality of the conflict and
perhaps increased nationalist sentiment amongst Çiller’s base. The severity of this and high
frequency violent incidents undoubtedly played a role in the further escalation of the conflict.
The geographic location of Kurdish population centers, as well as the PKK presence in Iraqi
Kurdistan pushed the Turkish government to widen the conflict, even performing an incursion
into Iraqi territory in 1991, risking the expansion of the conflict into a MID. The possibility of
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expanded political or perhaps even military power for the Kurds via a kinship group in Russia
was enough threat to the Turkish government for them to expend valuable political capital to
intervene directly. Perhaps the most interesting observation from this analysis is how the PKK’s
connections to Peshmerga forces and other Kurdish groups in northern Iraq affected the
administration’s response to PKK actions. After Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the Gulf War and
the strengthening of Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy, the Özal administration attempted a cessation
of hostilities to prevent the secession of its Kurdish territories. The Çiller administration,
however, reversed this policy, cracking down on Kurdish regions and expanding the conflict
despite international disapproval. While many factors undoubtedly played a role in this policy
shift, the continued economic downturn and precarious political situation amongst the base
population seem to have influenced the Çiller administration’s evaluation of the Kurds’ political
utility.
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IV. Research Design and Analysis
The case of the “Kurdish Question” yields several concepts that seem to have an impact
on the targeting process. There is no doubt that smoking-gun level evidence that states pursue
domestic diversionary violence is impossible to collect because state leaders are rational actors
and logically would not benefit from admitting such a tactic, but a quantitative analysis of
hundreds of cases of intrastate violence involving state forces and minority populations should
shed light on the frequency of these occurrences and establish a correlation between violence and
increased popularity for state leadership. It can also help definitively differentiate between which
variables are unique to the Kurdish case, and which are universal in the diversionary process.
This analysis will help gauge whether these identified concepts also contribute to the
diversionary targeting framework. I synthesize these identified concepts into distinct variables
which capture their essential dimensions. My research utilizes the Minorities at Risk (2009)
database to establish quantitative backing for a set of seven variables that have not yet been
assessed in the domestic diversionary literature. These variables are [1] history of grievances: the
frequency and severity of past violent incidents between the state and a domestic minority group,
[2] the geographic concentration of the minority group, [3] the level of economic discrimination
faced by the minority group, [4] the protest level of a minority group prior to conflict outbreak,
[5] international governmental support level for the minority group, [6] non-state actor
international support level and [7] level of kindred group support.

Building the Dependent Variable and Controls
Traditional diversionary war theory has always sought to link domestic conditions to the
outbreak of MIDs. Domestic diversionary research has followed a similar path, as domestic
conditions are linked to violence against domestic minority groups. This article attempts a
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similar goal, identifying the impact of a set of conditions on the likelihood of domestic
diversionary targeting. Thus, the dependent variable is the same: the presence or absence of a
diversionary conflict in any given observation. This dependent variable was thus constructed
primarily from three sources: World Bank’s “GDP Growth (Annual %) Data (2019),” the
Minorities at Risk Project (2009) Database, and the Cline Center for Advanced Social Research’s
“Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED)” Civil Unrest Database (Nardulli et
al. 2015).
As minority group population size, military capabilities, economic underperformance,
and the presence of popular unrest are all assumed to be necessary for a diversionary attempt to
occur, these variables are operationalized as controls. An index of economic and civil conditions
is designed which incorporates each country in the MAR Database in order to control for these
conditions. Economic conditions are confirmed through Word Bank data measuring annual
percentage GDP change (GDP Growth Annual % Data 2019). Civil unrest conditions were
determined using the Cline Center’s SPEED Dataset, which unfortunately only provides data for
the years 1945-2005 (Nardulli et al. 2015). Since the MAR Database provides data on the
requisite variables only for the years 2004-2005, this article’s dataset was limited to observations
from the year 2005, with data for the “recent grievances” variable coming from MAR data from
2004. The “recent grievances” variable draws partially on observations of repressive tactics used
against the minority group in the year preceding. Therefore, MAR data from 2004 could not be
used to increase the temporal range of the study because there is no MAR data available from the
year 2003 with which to build the “recent grievances” variable for the year 2004. The SPEED
Civil Unrest data were corroborated with qualitative explanations of state-level and regional
tensions from Human Rights Watch (HRW) Reports by Country and Region (2020) reports by
country and region. An assessment of military capabilities relative to the minority group is
established in the form of an index, with the assumption that state military capabilities must
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greatly outmatch those of the minority at risk group. This control variable is aided by the fact
that for the minority group in the MAR Database to be considered “at risk,” they must lack
substantial military capabilities to rival those of the state. Finally, to control for minority group
population size, every minority with a population of less than 100,000 within a state is excluded
from the dataset, as the population must be substantial enough for a diversionary attempt to
attract popular attention. The MAR Database already filters for this population control, ensuring
that each group included in my analysis is already considered to be of substantial size. This
variable is not without its deficiencies, for example, if the minority group only reaches 100,000
people and resides in China, with a population of approximately 1.4 billion, then the group may
not have a substantial population relative to the base population. However, most countries
included in the dataset represent far lower populations than the most populous country on earth,
and their minority populations therefore are relatively more substantial. In the case of China, it is
the exception that proves the rule.

Building the Dataset and its Temporal Limitations
Following the trail of Tir and Jasinski (2008), a dataset of individual minority groups at
risk within a country was established by utilizing the available data from the Minorities at Risk
Project (2009) Database. This data provides observations from multiple minority groups at risk
within a single country, if there are any present. This yielded a set of 284 total observations—but
this is where my data collection departs from previous literature. Because the diversionary
literature emphasizes that political unrest and economic underperformance/volatility should be
occurring at the time that the conflict takes place, these conditions had to be accounted for in the
data.
Data on economic underperformance was taken from World Bank (GDP Growth Annual
% Data 2019). Where possible, multiple data points for each country were used to confirm
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economic underperformance. Measurements for overall unemployment levels and GDP growth
were both used as indicators of economic performance, because GDP alone might not accurately
depict quality of life for a state’s citizens. However, unemployment measurements were not
available through World Bank (Unemployment Annual % Data 2019) for all the states in the
dataset, at which point GDP measurements were used instead (GDP Growth Annual % Data
2019). If the observed state had either seen a reduction in GDP growth from the previous year or
an increase in unemployment level over the previous year, it was coded as underperforming
economically. Using two measurements ensured a higher level of certainty about the economic
situation in each observed country. Some specific countries in the MAR Database were excluded
at this point, as, for example, Taiwan is not included in World Bank data as an independent state.
This yielded a total set of 117 countries from which targeting attempts against multiple domestic
minority groups could be analyzed. World Bank measurements on economic underperformance
were then combined with the Cline Center SPEED data on civil unrest to provide a complete list
of states included in the MAR Database which met the preconditions for diversionary conflict to
occur.
Once this variable for diversionary preconditions had been created, it was possible to
winnow it further by identifying the states in which violence targeting the minority group had
occurred in 2005. The MAR Project (2009) Database details the type of repressive tactic used by
the state against a minority group. With this data in hand, only cases in which violent tactics
were used against the minority group were coded. Repressive tactics that fell short of violence
were excluded from the cases of domestic diversionary conflict. Thus, 284 total minority groups
in 117 countries within the MAR Project (2009) Database formed a comprehensive set of cases
for the year 2005.
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Operationalizing the Independent Variables
Tir and Jasinski’s (2008) work on domestic diversionary conflicts focused on analyzing
the impact of some crucial variables in state-minority group relations, including the size of the
minority population, how much political discrimination it faces, and others. However, the case
study on the Kurdish Question identified several variables which could impact the targeting
process and have not yet been addressed in the literature. It is the goal of this article to design a
model which encompasses the essential dimensions of these variables and evaluates their overall
impact on the dependent variable. This will help identify which variables have universal impact,
and which are special to the Kurdish case in Turkey. The causal logic of this theory allows for
four independent variables to be analyzed against three constants, described below:

1. Recent Grievances
Other contributions to the literature have correlated the presence of ongoing conflict in a
state to the likelihood of a diversionary attack against a minority group (Tir and Jasinski 2008:
652). However, the level of violence or repression levied against a minority group prior to a
domestic diversionary attack occurring has not yet been considered. If a minority group has
already been targeted recently by the state, the political cost for achieving a rally around the flag
effect (the ultimate aim of the diversionary process) is much lower for state leadership because
there is no need to construct a narrative from scratch as to why the voter base should support the
state’s aggression. As rational political utility maximizers, state leadership would assumedly
target the group whose threat to national security has already been established in the state’s
narrative. Because of the substantial utility potential for the state in the presence of recent
grievances, it is expected that this variable will have the highest impact in the model. To capture
this dimension, I build an index of violent or repressive incidents targeting a specific minority
group by utilizing the quantitative data provided by the MAR Project (2009) Database in the
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“overnment repression of group” variable. The type of violence indicated by this variable is
coded to form a comprehensive index of minority interactions and conflict outbreak. The
presence or absence of state repression of the minority group in the year preceding the observed
diversionary violence is operationalized as a scale of [0, 1, 2], with [0] representing no recent
grievance, [1] representing repressive tactics that fall short of outright violence, and [2] depicting
a violent tactic utilized by the state against the minority group in the preceding year. This
indexing of repressive tactics is a strength of this variable, as it accounts for the multitude of
government repressive tactics used against minority groups, while simultaneously integrating
them into a manageable scale. It is expected that if more violent tactics are used by the state, the
level of grievance will be higher. Thus, cases in which violent repressive tactics were used in the
recent past will be most likely to correlate to diversionary violence in 2005.
There are shortfalls to this operationalization. First, this research is hindered by its
temporal range; with only data from 2004 and 2005 available for this analysis, wider patterns of
diversionary violence are difficult to observe. This variable could undoubtedly be more precisely
captured in the future as recent data on conflicts from 2007 onward are added to the MAR
Project Database and others. But given the constraints placed on data collection for this article at
the time of writing, this variable provides the best available measurement of this dimension.
Second, there is the issue of bleedover of violence from the previous year. If violent tactics are
used against a minority group in the previous year and in 2005, the observation in question could
potentially be a continuation of that same violence and thus subject to domestic conditions prior
to 2004 and therefore not observed in the measurements for this variable. I argue that this is in
fact a strength of this study. Whether the conflict observed in 2005 is a picking-up, continuation,
or escalation of diversionary tactics begun previously, state leadership clearly sees some benefit
in persisting. As diversionary violence is only coded in this dataset if civil unrest or economic
underperformance is occurring in the observed state, the continuation of diversionary attempts in
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the face of this statewide turmoil speaks to the utility of this tactic. A resumption of hostilities
further suggests the utility of diversionary tactics—their repetitive use indicates that state
leadership is not just experimenting with increasing popularity at home but trusts the impact of
these tactics. Therefore, the explanatory power of this variable and its importance to the theory
necessitates its inclusion. Despite the evident drawbacks of its operationalization, it is the only
construction which captures the necessary dimensions of this variable.

2. Geographic Concentration of Minority Group
Although state military power is more easily projected within the confines of the state’s
own borders, it is still a finite resource. If multiple minority groups are present within a country,
all other factors being equal, the state would likely choose to target a minority group whose
population mostly resides in a “regional base,” described by the MAR Project (2007: 8) as, “…a
spatially contiguous region larger than an urban area that is part of the country, in which 24% or
more of the minority resides and in which the minority constitutes the predominant proportion of
the population.” A minority’s regional base is not only a more attractive state target because of
its centralized location, but also because there is a smaller proportion of the base population
present in this location. This means that the diversionary attempt potentially has less chance of
causing blowback from collateral casualties in the base population. This perhaps also increases
the state leadership’s willingness to engage in a more violent or less restricted conflict.
Therefore, it is predicted that the presence of a regional base for a minority group will increase
its chances of being targeted by the state for a diversionary attack.
Several other dimensions to this variable could impact the likelihood of a minority group
being targeted. The proximity of a regional base to a bordering state, particularly one in which a
substantial population of minority kindship groups reside, could act as a deterrent to diversionary
attempts, as the state leadership fears internationalizing the violence. However, this ethnic
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kinship dimension is addressed in another variable and will thus not be included here to prevent
covariance in the model. It could also be assumed that geographic obstructions between state
forces and the minority group’s regional base, such as mountains and rivers, form natural lines of
defense that could limit any enhancements to state military projection capabilities stemming
from the minority group’s geographic concentration. However, most modern state militaries have
access to airpower that reduces the defensive impact of mountainous terrain and as the state is
operating within its own borders, it is unlikely to deal with problems like blown bridges and
roads that become major hindrances in MIDs (at least until in close proximity to a minority
group’s regional base). Because even the most poverty-stricken governments have access to
rudimentary air support and they are operating within their own borders, geographic and
topographic features are unlikely to have an impact on the success of a diversionary attempt.
Thus, the necessary dimension to operationalize in this concept is the overall geographic
concentration of the minority group.
To capture this dimension, this article relies on data on minority bases already collected
through the MAR Project Database. Geographic concentration is enumerated in the MAR
Database as several variables, some of which factor in the presence or absence of a minority
regional base, and the population concentration of the minority group within that base. By
focusing on this regional base concept, these measurements are more restrictive than necessary
for this article’s purposes. If a minority population is widely dispersed, it is expected to be harder
to target than if the group is highly concentrated in a region, not exclusively one city and its
surrounding areas. Therefore, geographic concentration is determined without the inclusion of
minority base presence and composition. This article’s geographic concentration variable is
operationalized as a scale from [0, 1, 2, 3], with [0] indicating a widely dispersed minority group
population, [1] indicating a primarily urban located minority population or that they are a
minority in one region and dispersed in others, [2] expresses that the minority group is the
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majority in one region, and dispersed throughout other regions, while [3] depicts that the
minority group is concentrated in one region. These measurements explain how the level of
minority group geographic concentration impacts its likelihood of being targeted in a permissive
fashion, accounting for the dimension of higher concentration of population, as well as the
presence or absence of a majority of the minority group in a specific region of the country being
observed. This variable thus includes the necessary dimensions to grasp the heart of this concept
while only leaving behind the dimensions that are considered unnecessary for explanatory
purposes as described above. It is expected that the higher the number on this scale that a
minority group receives, the more likely they are of being targeted for diversionary purposes
because they are more centrally located and there is less chance of collateral damage amongst the
base population of non-minority citizens. Thus, geographic concentration of the minority group
is expected to have a direct, positive relationship with the independent variable.
There are some downsides to operationalizing in this fashion. While group concentration
is the primary concern and is included as a dimension, dimensions like military projection
capabilities and size of the minority region relative to the overall size of the state are left behind.
If the state is so large as to make power projection capabilities difficult in areas far from military
bases of operations, the cost of carrying out a diversionary attack may simply be too high, even if
the minority group is highly concentrated in a region. However, there are few states large enough
for this to become an issue, and the largest states (e.g. Russian Federation, People’s Republic of
China) have highly developed militaries that are more than capable of projecting power within
their own territory.
Indeed, the very definition of sovereignty implies the ability of the state to enforce its
laws and defend its citizens, i.e. A monopoly on violence. Should the state be unable to project
power within its own country, it is doubtful that it has a monopoly on violence and may therefore
be evidence of a failed state. In a conflict where a non-state entity perpetrates enough of the
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violence represent an existential threat to state leadership, the conflict is indicative of a civil war
or revolution and is therefore not diversionary in nature. If state leadership is fighting a domestic
conflict in which its very existence is in jeopardy, it likely has larger concerns than public unrest
or a faltering economy. By excluding failed states from this article’s dataset, this issue has been
nullified. For the purposes of exclusion, a failed state was defined as any state undergoing an
intrastate war not fully in its own power to suppress. As the Minorities at Risk Project (2009)
contains a cross-identification code for each observation to the Correlates of War Database
(COW) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), the type of war ongoing at the time of the MAR Project
observation could be identified, and any failed states thus excluded from the final dataset.
A further argument against this operationalization of minority group concentration is the
issue of utility from the diversionary attack—if the minority group is settled far away from the
base population, then attacking the group is unlikely to yield a rally around the flag effect
because the base population is unconcerned with events happening on the front lines, far away
from their population centers. However, in the event of a diversionary attack, it can be easily
assumed that the state will push as much media attention as possible on the ongoing violence to
encourage a surge in nationalism. With the ubiquity of internet, radio, and television news in
every region of the globe in this article’s sample year of 2005, ensuring that the diversionary
conflict is a headline in domestic affairs should be easily achievable by every country in the
dataset.

3. Economic Discrimination against the Minority Group
The state may use many types of discrimination to limit the prosperity of its minority
groups. Though the impact of political and cultural marginalization on the targeting process has
been observed in the literature, there is little discussion of the impact of economic
discrimination, possibly because of the difficulty in controlling for the many intervening
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variables that might affect this dimension. First, it is unlikely that a state’s natural resources
should be evenly distributed amongst its minority groups. Indeed, the argument could be made
the minority is marginalized to begin with due to its inability to capitalize on resources that were
available to other state actors during the development of the state. Second, control of natural
resources may mean that what is seen as economic discrimination is actually an attempt at an
equitable distribution of limited state assets. For example, the Kurds in Northern Iraq benefit
greatly from their control of oil resources in the region. As a result, their flourishing economy is
not necessarily critically hindered by receiving less state-level investment in its industries from
Baghdad. What on paper may qualify as economic discrimination, in reality becomes less
convincing.
For this article’s purposes, I argue that these intervening variables do not necessarily
warrant the exclusion of this dimension of the diversionary process. An exploration of the
minorities included in the MAR Project (2009) Database reveals that in some extraordinary cases
like Iraqi Kurdistan, some minorities have access to resources that others in the country do not,
but these groups are unlikely to be included in the MAR Project Database, and even if they were,
would only serve as the very few exceptions that prove the rule. Furthermore, Iraqi Kurdistan’s
unique relationship with its government comes as a result of direct foreign intervention in Iraq
due to the use of chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians in the region and Saddam Hussein’s
defeat in the Gulf War, making it a well-known and fairly unique case of high-level foreign
government military support. Because at-risk minorities so rarely have access to economic
advantages that other groups in the state system do not, these few cases are unlikely to variable’s
performance in the final model.
As economic instability and underperformance define the domestic environment in which
diversionary violence takes place, the impact of economic discrimination specifically cannot be
overlooked. Other forms of discrimination have been analyzed by the literature and found to be
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insignificant to domestic diversionary violence and can therefore be put aside for the purposes of
this article. But in a situation where an economy is faltering, a logical step taken by the state may
be to limit economic benefits for the minority group, favoring the base population. From a causal
perspective, this strategy does two things, [1] it pushes more capital and resources to the base
population, who largely decide whether the state leadership stays in power and [2] can be a
component of a state-driven narrative that the minority group is responsible for the country’s
current economic woes. This helps to shift blame away from state leadership at the same time
that diversionary violence takes place, having an additive effect on the diversionary attempt. It is
therefore expected that economic discrimination will have a direct, positive impact on the
independent variable.
The MAR Project Database contains data for economic discrimination, indexed to
indicate different levels of economic discrimination levied against a minority group by the state:
[0] no discrimination, [1] basic neglect by the state but some remedial policies, [2] neglect with
no remedial policies, [3] social exclusion or a neutral policy, and [4] active repressive policies
that restrict a minority group’s economic activities (Minorities at Risk Project 2007: 11). I utilize
this index for this article, as its level of nuance into the different types of economic
discrimination should show the variable’s correlation or lack thereof to the likelihood of
diversionary violence occurring. Because of the strong causal link between economic
discrimination and diversionary tactics explained in this theory, economic discrimination is
expected to have a substantial impact on the model, close to that of geographic concentration but
perhaps not as high as recent grievances.

4. Protest Level of the Minority Group
Unlike the “recent grievances” variable which attempts to capture the dimension of
government repression on likelihood of diversionary conflict, the spirit of the “protest level”
43

variable is to quantify whether the level of protest amongst a minority group has an impact on its
likelihood of being targeted by the state. The causal logic is straightforward: diversionary war
literature dictates that economic underperformance is a precursor to this type of conflict
occurring. Economic underperformance means fewer resources, fewer jobs, and fewer friends in
intrastate relations. Competing over these resources becomes more heated in the event of a
recession or otherwise catastrophic economic event, and a marginalized minority group is likely
to protests as a result. Ensuing pushback against state policies is likely to spur resentment
amongst the base population, and act as a catalyst for further repression and state-sanctioned
violence against the minority. Therefore, the higher the protest level of the minority group, the
more likely that they will be targeted for diversionary purposes. State repression of protesting
minority groups is designed to dampen protests for multiple reasons; [1] it shuts down protests
before they can cause significant economic damage to an already injured economy, and [2] the
show of force can act as a deterrent factor for protests among society outside the minority group.
The essential dimension to depict in this variable is the level of protest amongst the
minority group. The MAR Project Database provides measurements for level of minority protest
in an index from [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. These values indicate different protest activities rated as low to
high severity, with [0] indicating none reported, [1] verbal resistance in the form of calls for
independence, [2] symbolic protest such as sabotage, destruction of property, and organized
political actions, [3] small protests and demonstrations involving fewer than 10,000 people, [4]
medium-size protests involving between 10,000 and 100,000 participants, and [5] large protests
involving over 100,000 people (Minorities at Risk Project 2007: 22).
This variable adequately operationalizes the level of protest for the purposes of this
article, but that does not mean that it encompasses every dimension of this concept or that it does
not have its drawbacks. While the level of ongoing protest in the context of independence
movements and anti-government protest is depicted, there is an issue of scale—significant
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protest could occur in a minority group with fewer than 100,000 people but not be reported as a
level [4] event because of the minority’s size. In countries with total populations of only 3 or 4
million, this could become a reporting issue, since a protest involving 50,000 people in a country
this size would still be relatively important. However, this problem is partially remedied by the
fact that only minorities with at least 100,000 members or greater than 1 percent of the total
population are included in the MAR Project Database. Protest level therefore should still be
adequately measured despite this drawback.
Also, this variable leaves behind the dimension of protest level in other minority groups.
There is a lot of nuance to be teased from the concept of interplay between protesting minority
groups, for example, in a country with multiple minority groups, protests in one group could
inspire other groups to join the same cause. This could be a threat to state stability. However, this
article codes the protest level for individual minority groups within a country for the same year,
so if protests are taking place in multiple minority groups, this dimension should still be present
in the final model by determining which protesting groups were targeted for diversionary
attempts. Furthermore, this variable excludes any data about which segments of the minority
group are protesting. It would be interesting to know whether protesting political elites in a MAR
group or working-class individuals have a greater impact on the likelihood of a diversionary
attempt taking place. However, that dimension is outside the parameters of this research and
therefore not necessary to represent in the final model.
Despite the dimensions left behind in this variable, “protest level” is expected to have a
direct, positive impact on the model. As the level of protest increases, there will be increased
urgency in state leadership to shut it down to prevent further economic disruption and maintain
stability. If these protests continue, a show of force against the minority group in the form of
diversionary violence would be an appealing option for state leadership as a warning to other
groups interested in engaging in protest or other disruptive activities.
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5. International Non-State Support Level
Many minority groups receive international support from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) like Red Cross or Amnesty International in the form of discrete resources,
political action and even, in the case of terror groups like Boko Haram, military support. This
international support can implicitly signal to state leaders that targeting this minority group could
lead to international consequences, thus making the group a less desirable target. Tir and Jasinski
(2008) contend that this effect is so strong as to completely exclude any groups with substantial
international support from their dataset. However, in a case of economic underperformance, in
which state leadership is losing popularity in its base, international support may take a backseat
to quieting domestic unrest. There may even be cases in which ignoring or flagrantly disobeying
international insistence on state behavior is a benefit to state leadership. For example, Vladimir
Putin’s 1999 war in Chechnya only strengthened his domestic approval rating, despite
widespread international concern regarding violation of human rights and threats of sanctions
against the Russian Federation. I therefore argue that this dimension may play a role in the
diversionary targeting process, and minority groups with substantial international support should
be analyzed to see whether this support acts as a deterrent against domestic diversionary
targeting.
Non-state support is measured in the MAR database by three separate variables, [1]
political support, [2] military support, and [3] material support. Political support is expected to
have the least utility to the minority group—they are a foreign actor below the state level and
therefore their political support would be limited and likely easily ignored by the minority’s state
government. Non-state political support may include advocacy groups which can appeal the
plight of the minority group at an international stage like the United Nations (UN), but not every
group is capable of drawing such specific attention from support groups, and even if they do
receive assistance, there is no guarantee of international intervention, particularly as these events
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are occurring domestically and do not involve a MID. Military support is expected to have the
most utility, as a minority with military capabilities becomes a far less attractive target to a state
leader wary of casualties and becoming mired in a protracted conflict. Material support is
expected to have an intermediate level of utility to the minority group—while not particularly
useful for defense purposes, food, medicine, and other resources can be extremely useful in
helping the minority to stave off displacement and the damaging effects of economic
discrimination. An index of these three measures provides a comprehensive overview of the level
of support for a minority group to determine its overall deterrent effect. A scale from [0] to [6]
indicates the level of non-state international support that a minority group has: [0] for no
observed non-state international support, [1] for political support, [2] for material support, and
[3] for military support. Therefore, if a minority group receives political, material, and military
non-state international support, they have the highest level of non-state actor international
support possible, which is then coded as a [6]. This indexed variable then becomes an aggregate
indicator of international non-state level support for the minority group.
To ensure that the political, military, and material components do in fact have different
impacts and should be weighted differently, three control variables with measures of non-state
actor political, material, and military support are run through the model as well, to ensure that
these variables to do not perform better when measured on their own. These three control
variables are derived from the MAR Database, and are coded binary, [0] representing no support
of the given kind, and [1] representing its presence.
An argument to this variable is that there are many different kinds of non-state support a
minority group from which a minority group can garner support, and therefore nearly all
minority groups will receive at least some form of it. Indeed “non-state” is a broad term which
the MAR Project (2007: 16) defines as, “…non-governmental organizations (e.g., the Red Cross,
Amnesty International, Gates Foundation), but also include prominent individuals (e.g., Jimmy
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Carter, Bono), religious organizations (e.g. The Catholic Church), and transnational criminal and
terrorist organizations (e.g., al Qaeda).” With such a broad definition for non-state support, there
is uncertainty present over which type of non-state support is most effective. In other words, it
could be fairly argued that this variable operationalization is too reductive to be useful. Clearly
receiving weapons and military supplies from Hizb’allah cannot be equated to receiving
advocacy or famine relief supplies from the Red Cross. By indexing the variable, different types
of support are accounted for in the same variable which helps ameliorate this problem. This
variable could by differentiating between which type of non-state actor is providing the support,
but this is outside the parameters of this article. For the purposes of this paper, a binary
indication of non-state support will help to initially prove the presence of a correlation to
diversionary violence.
Non-state actor international support for the minority group is expected to have a direct,
positive relationship with the likelihood of diversionary violence. Thus, a high level of non-state
actor support is expected to correlate to a higher likelihood of diversionary violence. Non-state
actor support should have an impact on the final model but is expected to be less significant than
the primary independent variables.

6. Foreign State-Level and IGO Support
Non-state actor support for minority groups is not constricted by economic and political
pressures like foreign state-level and international governmental organization (IGO) support.
However, states and international institutions like the UN generally have greater access to the
resources necessary to aid a jeopardized minority group, though they may be hampered by the
political drawbacks that intervention entails. Similar to non-state foreign support, state-level
foreign support is measured as three variables: political, military, and material. State-level
military support is expected to have the most impact, while material support is expected to be
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more impactful than political support due to the same logic as “non-state actor support,” namely,
that a state in a dire enough economic situation to consider a diversionary attack is unlikely to be
dissuaded from its course by foreign political action. Like international non-state support, this
variable is constructed as an index of three measurements of support.
Traditionally, the causal logic behind this variable has been that foreign state support for
a potential diversionary target acts as a deterrent, as the state leader would not want to risk and
international intervention. Attacking a minority group with foreign state advocacy or
military/material support carries even stronger international implications than ignoring a
concerned NGO. However, as was observed during the Çiller administration, Turkish state
leadership weighed the impact of reductions to their military support from the United States and
other NATO partners against the benefits of continuing their conflict against the Kurds and chose
to widen the conflict. This observation indicates that foreign state and IGO political support of
the minority group was not enough to prevent the conflict. If state leadership are the political
utility maximizers that diversionary war theory assumes them to be, then foreign state support of
a minority group is not enough of a deterrent to prevent diversionary violence.
In fact, states with faltering economies or facing high levels of unpopularity may actually
benefit from foreign state support of the minority group. If a state is attempting a rally around the
flag effect to secure their hold on power, then the state will try the most expedient process
available to engender nationalist sentiment. If a foreign state is supporting a minority group, then
cries of foreign meddling in domestic affairs will only further the targeting state’s agenda and
enhance the persecutorial narrative they are building. In this way, the foreign state and IGO
reaction to diversionary tactics may actually aid state leadership and encourage the continuation
or repetition of this behavior. As much of the civil conflict literature describes, domestic
conflicts most frequently occur in economically deprived and volatile countries (Tir and Jasinski
2008; Henderson and Singer 2000; Besancon 2005). States in this position, for the most part,
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may determine through the diversionary calculus that they cannot attempt an economic recovery
if they are no longer in power, therefore diversionary violence is worthwhile, even if it worsens
domestic economic conditions.
This variable is measured in an identical scale to the non-state actor variable. Foreign
state support is indexed from [0] to [6], indicating how much foreign state or IGO support is
present for a minority group: [0] no foreign state or IGO support, [1] political support, [2]
material support, and [3] military support. A minority group receiving political, material, and
military foreign state or IGO support scores a [6], the highest possible measurement of support.
The foreign state or IGO support variable runs into a similar dilemma as the non-state
actor support variable—building an index of support may mask interactions between different
types of foreign state support because they weighted differently within the indexed variable. To
control for this issue, just like the non-state actor support variable, individual measures for each
type of foreign state or IGO support level are taken from the MAR Project Database and utilized
in the final model. These interactions are then compared to the indexed variable to provide a
comprehensive picture of foreign state or IGO support for a minority group’s impact on the
likelihood of violence occurring.
The indexed variable for foreign state or IGO support of a minority group is expected to
have a direct, positive relationship with the likelihood of diversionary tactics being used. As the
level of foreign state military, material, and political support increases, the easier it is for the
state to construct a narrative in which the minority group has aligned with foreign interests to
undermine the welfare of the nation. This variable follows a similar construction to non-state
actor support, and individual measures for different types of support will be included as well.
Foreign state and IGO support is expected to be impactful on the model, but be less significant
than the main independent variables described above.
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7. Kindred Group Support
While many minorities find support from kindred groups settled across a national border,
there is nuance to the level of that support. Simply having distant relatives of a minority group
settled in a different country is unlikely to offer the state much opportunity to build the
scapegoating narrative, unless those kinship groups have enough influence in a foreign country
to alter international opinion and make themselves known to the domestic base population.
However, a kindred group with substantial economic and military strength, settled just across a
national border from the regional base of a domestic minority group could provide considerable
support to a domestic minority group. If a domestic minority group with this level of crossborder kinship support were to be targeted by the state, it may be easy for minority refugees as
well as militia personnel or weapons and supplies to bleed across the border, limiting the
effectiveness of the diversionary attempt.
The cross-border kin may also support any defensive effort mounted by the minority
group, funneling supplies, weapons, and warfighters across the border, leading to a far more
protracted struggle than originally intended by the state leadership, and perhaps deepening the
financial predicament that was the impetus for the diversionary attempt. Describing the
relationship between the PKK and KDP prior to 1985, Gunter (1996: 51) indicates that, “PKK
militants being trained in Syrian and Lebanese camps were slowly moved to northern Iraq, where
new camps were established.” Locating the camps outside Turkey with the support of Kurdish
kindred groups in Syria, Iraq and other countries allowed the PKK to continue their resistance
movement with less fear of their training camps being destroyed by Turkish security forces.
Finally, if the transnational kin wield significant power in the neighboring state system,
perhaps even being the majority across the border, there is a risk of internationalizing the
conflict, which could draw in an international intervention. The varying levels kinship support
may increase a minority group’s likelihood of being targeted for diversionary violence, because
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the state’s narrative that the minority group is a threat becomes more credible as the level of
transnational kinship support increases. Therefore, transnational kinship as a variable is
structured as a scale, on which a low-level of cross-border kindred group support is unlikely to
be increase the likelihood of targeting, but high levels of kindred support effectively augment the
scapegoating narrative and therefore increases the risk of being targeted for diversionary
violence.
This scale follows the same construction of the other two “support” variables as it is
indexed from [0] to [6]. These measurements equate to the following: [0] no kindred support, [1]
political support, [2] material support, and [3] military support. A minority group receiving
political, material, and military kindred support scores a [6], the highest possible measurement of
support. To control for the performance of each type of support outside the boundaries of the
indexed variables, individual measurements for each of the three types of support are also
accounted for in the model, providing an extra layer of detail in how much impact these variables
have on the model. Just like the foreign state or IGO support variable and the non-state actor
support variable, the individual measurements for kindred support are binary, coded as [0] no
support and [1] support is present. Data for these measurements is derived from the MAR
Dataset.
The kindred support variable faces challenges that the other two “support” variables do
not, because geographic proximity could play an important factor in the strength of a kindred
group. As discussed above, a minority group in a state which is concentrated near a powerful
kindred group on the other side of a national border would theoretically be much less likely to be
attacked by the state, as opposed to a minority group with limited kindred support, or kindred
support which is several countries or more away. Using the example from the Kurdish Question
case study, Kurdish diaspora groups far removed in Europe have been unable to provide more
than indirect political support by pressuring their host nation’s leadership to sanction Turkey or
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utilize other, more diplomatic means of pressure. However, the population of Iraqi Kurdistan,
which shares a mountainous border with the Kurdish Anatolian regions in southeast Turkey,
were able to provide weapons, material support, and safe harbor to retreating PKK forces during
the Kurdish offensives of the Özal and Çiller administrations, though the infighting between
competing Kurdish militant groups does indicate that kindred support groups can cut both ways
(Gunter 1996: 50-62). These uncomfortable dichotomies in the effectiveness of kindred support
are difficult to bypass but ultimately unnecessary to address for the purposes of this article. As
this analysis of domestic diversionary targeting is only interested in identifying a correlation
between any kindred support and deterrence of diversionary violence, it is acceptable to index
kindred support in a similar way to the other two support variables.
Kindred support level is expected to have a direct, positive relationship with the
likelihood of a diversionary attempt. Thus, the more kindred support that a minority group
receives, the more likely they are to be targeted. Kindred support level is expected to have a
correlation to diversionary violence but is not expected to be as impactful as the primary
independent variables: recent grievances, geographic concentration, economic discrimination,
and protest level.

Hypotheses
In examining the forthcoming data, some trends should be apparent due to the causal
mechanisms mentioned above. State leaders rarely reveal their entire motive for behavior and
policy implementation. What is stated officially often does not represent the whole truth. If state
leaders pursuing a diversionary conflict informed the population of the true purpose of a conflict
against a minority group (a distraction from other, more pressing domestic problems), then there
would be no real benefit to the diversion. It can therefore be safely assumed that the expressed
motives of state leaders are deliberately inaccurate portrayals of this type of conflict. It can also
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be assumed that the ingroup/outgroup interaction in domestic diversionary violence will require
the outgroup to be weak enough to not represent an existential threat to the survival of the state.
If it did, this scenario would not be representative of a diversionary war because the survival of
the sovereign state is the fundamental concern of a nation, superseding economic performance or
political cohesion.
Given the near impossibility of conclusively proving the motives of state leadership even
with empirical evidence or firsthand accounts of events from within state administrations, the
goal of this paper is not to provide objective proof that states engage in diversionary tactics.
Rather, the aim is to establish a causal narrative and provide empirical evidence to support the
theory that state leaders deliberately select one minority group for diversionary tactics over
another, due to a specific set of conditions. While several determinants of diversionary target
selection have been laid out here, it is beyond the bounds of this research to focus on all of them.
Specifically, this article determines the impact of a history of grievances, minority geographic
concentration, economic discrimination, minority protest level, international non-state support
level, foreign state and IGO support level, and kindred group support. To prevent selecting on the
dependent variable, observations in which minority groups which were not targeted in
diversionary violence will also be analyzed. This has led to five hypotheses to evaluate the
impact of these variables on target selection for domestic diversionary conflict.
Some of these variables are expected to be more impactful than others. Geographic
concentration and history of grievances are expected to have the most effect, as they represent
the areas of greatest political and military utility for state leadership and therefore the most
frequently present in the targeting process. International non-state actor and foreign state support
variables are expected to the least impactful, as by diversionary logic, if a diversionary attack
takes place, it is because the state’s economic situation is already desperate enough to warrant the
cannibalization of domestic resources (military resources, political capital expended, damage to
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infrastructure and economy). In this situation, the state is less likely to respond to international
political pressure and may even use it to further the scapegoating narrative. These variables are
divided into five hypotheses taking into account the seven independent variables whose impact it
is the goal of this article to measure against the controls.

Hypothesis 1: If a minority group has a significant history of recent grievances with the
majority, then they are the most likely minority group in a state system to be the target of
domestic diversionary violence.
Hypothesis 2: If a minority group has a high level of geographic concentration, they are more
likely to be targeted for diversionary violence.
Hypothesis 3: If a minority group experiences a high level of economic discrimination, they are
more likely to be targeted by diversionary violence.
Hypothesis 4: If a minority group is increasing its protest level, it is more likely to experience
diversionary violence.
Hypothesis 5: If a minority group has a high level of external support from foreign state actors
and IGOs, non-state international actors, or kindred groups abroad, they are less likely to be
targeted for diversionary violence.

The Measurements and the Model
Of the seven independent variables, multiple measurements were developed for four.
Geographic concentration had two measurements, one focusing on the proportion of the minority
group population settled within the regional base, and one focusing on the percentage of each
minority group settled within a specific region. These measurements both captured the same
dimension of the geographic concentration variable, and so each was included in the models to
the exclusion of the other. Non-state actor support had four measurements: [1] measured non55

state actor political support, [2] material support, [3] military support, and [4] an index of those
three measures. Foreign state and IGO support also had four measurements: [1] measured foreign
state political support, [2] material support, [3] military support, and [4] an index of those three
measures. Kindred support had four measurements as well: [1] measured kindred political
support, [2] material support, [3] military support, and [4] an index of those three measures.
Recent grievances, economic discrimination, and protest level had only one measurement each.
Ultimately, including the measurements for the control variables, a total of 25 measurements
factored into the design.
All the measurements for the seven independent variables were run through an ordered
logistic regression to determine the optimal model. This model ended up as follows:

Polr(formula = DIV_VIOL_2005 ~ indexksup + indexnsasup + indexstamatsup +
Recent.Grievance + GROUPCON + PROT + ECDIS, data = divers.data)
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V. Results and Discussion
In this model, the variables performed as follows:
Coefficients

Value

Standard Error

T-value

Kindred Support
Index
Non-State Actor
Support Index
Foreign State/IGO
Support Index
Recent Grievances

0.05165

0.1896

0.2725

-0.07898

0.1492

-0.5295

0.11223

0.1098

1.0222

1.84582

0.1939

9.5201

0.28635

0.1413

2.0271

-0.04054

0.0228

-1.7785

0.11441

0.1090

1.0496

Minority Group
Concentration
Protest
Economic
Discrimination

With all seven independent variables present in this model, the variables for recent grievances
[9.52], minority group population concentration [2.027], and protest level [-1.779] expressed
statistically significant t-value results. These t-values indicate a statistically significant
relationship between minority group concentration, protest level, recent grievances, and the
likelihood of a group being targeted for domestic diversionary conflict.
Interestingly, the protest variable displayed a negative t-value, indicating that the
presence of protests actually reduces the likelihood of attack. There are several possible
explanations for this. First, it seems plausible that if a minority group is already protesting, the
state is already using repressive tactics to contain it—tactics which fall short of diversionary
violence. It is furthermore plausible that as state leadership continues to build a narrative against
a minority group in preparation for a diversionary attempt, the state benefits from allowing the
minority to protest. If the minority is protesting and disrupting the economy, there is opportunity
for the base population to start feeling resentment toward the minority. Finally, if multiple
groups are protesting simultaneously in the country, the state may be devoting resources toward
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repressing the unrest in the base population and therefore not have the resources on hand for a
diversionary attempt (though it may be attempted later if the government fails to quell the unrest
in the base population).
Recent grievance was the most statistically significant variable in the model, with a tvalue of [9.52] indicating a strong correlation with the occurrence of diversionary violence. This
variable’s performance shows that recent repressive activity on behalf of the state (occurring the
year prior to the diversionary tactic in 2005), had a clear impact on the likelihood of the minority
group being targeted for diversionary purposes. This result confirms the expectations of the
primary hypothesis of this article for a direct, positive relationship between the recent grievances
variable and the dependent variable, as the presence of recent grievances in the form of
repressive tactics used against a minority group drastically increases the likelihood of that group
being targeted in the future.
The second highest performing variable was minority group concentration, which shows
a statistically significant t-value of [2.027]. As per the second hypothesis laid out above,
geographic concentration of the minority group seems to play a major role in its targeting by the
state. While other contributions to the literature have focused on the state’s military capabilities
(Tir and Jasinski 2008), geographic concentration appears to be an important indicator of the
state’s ability to target a minority group. This is a fairly intuitive argument—a state with limited
military capabilities will utilize those resources in the most efficient way possible. Thus, a more
concentrated group is more likely to be targeted because their concentration limits the need to
spread military forces across multiple regions of the state.
Of the main independent variables, the one that performed the poorest was economic
discrimination. In the final model, economic discrimination only had a t-value of [1.045], which
is far below the level for statistical significance. It was expected that this variable would have a
strong correlation to the dependent variable, because economic discrimination seemed a logical
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intermediary step before more violent repressive and diversionary tactics occur. However, the
results provide no support for this hypothesis. This may be because economic discrimination is
not an effective use of resources in a diversionary attempt—the state would rather use more
grandiose, visually diversionary methods to divert popular attention, such as conflict, which is
more easily televised. Intermediary variables may also mask the impact of this variable: in an
economic downturn, which occurs in every case of diversionary violence, it is possible that the
discrimination against the minority group becomes less visible as the economic disparity is
lessened. In other words, as the entire country loses capital and employment, their economic
deprivation levels begin to match the minority group which was already experiencing economic
discrimination. Whether intervening factors or the state deciding to utilize other repressive
tactics prior to a diversionary tactic were the cause, economic discrimination has little impact on
the diversionary targeting process.
Kindred support fell far below the threshold for statistical significance. In the best
performing model, this variable only reached a t-value of [0.273], going against this article’s
expectation that kindred support played an important role in the diversionary process. The
indexed kindred support variable was run first, and after statistical significance was not achieved
in any model, the three other individualized variables for kindred group political, material, and
military support were run both together and separately in the models to see if any gained
statistical significance. While several of these individualized variables performed better than a tvalue of [0.273] in other models, there was no model where these variables were statistically
significant.
There are several possible explanations for the kindred group support measurements’
underperformance. The first and most evident is that kindred support may not be significant
because a state utilizing diversionary tactics is already desperate enough to maintain its hold on
power that they are willing to risk a diversionary attempt, no matter how much extra support is
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provided by the kindred group. Though the relationship between this variable and the likelihood
of a diversionary attempt did follow the direction hypothesized, indicating that state leadership
may use the kindred support to fortify the scapegoating narrative and rally the base population,
the relationship was too far below statistical significance to warrant any in-depth discussion of its
ramifications. Furthermore, the dataset for this study may have been adversely affected by data
only being available for the year 2005. Unfortunately, the MAR Project Database only contains
observations for the necessary variables from the years 2004-2006, and the SPEED Civil Unrest
Database only contains data up until the year 2005 (Minorities at Risk Project 2009; Nardulli et
al. 2015). Viewed in a larger dataset over multiple years or even decades, this variable may
become more viable. Finally, as discussed in the operationalization section, this variable does not
differentiate between different types of kindred support, whether diaspora-based or close-border
kinship bonds. If the former, there is a logical limit on how much support the kindred group can
be reasonably expected to provide. If the latter, support may be more substantial but simply not
observed in the year 2005. A more specific operationalization of this variable may reveal that
kindred support level is a substantial indicator of diversionary violence occurring. Whatever the
reason, it is clear that this variable has no statistically significant effect on the dependent
variable.
A similar fate befell the non-state actor support variable. While this variable performed
slightly better than the kindred group support variable with a t-value of [-0.523], it still did not
achieve statistical significance. The direction of this variable’s relationship to the dependent
variable indicates a direct, negative relationship and not the direct, positive relationship expected
in the hypotheses. This may indicate that the causal logic for this variable is incorrect and that as
the level of non-state actor support increases, the likelihood of attack decreases. However, the
variable’s performance falls so below the level of statistical significance that it is not worth
conjecturing about in any great detail, despite the direction of this relationship not matching what
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was predicted in the hypothesis. The other individualized variables measuring specific non-state
political, military, or material support were also passed through the model, but all failed to
achieve statistical significance.
It was expected that non-state actor support would be less impactful on the model than
kindred support or foreign state actor or IGO support. While this variable is actually slightly
more impactful than kindred support, both variables are statistically insignificant, therefore the
theoretical underpinnings of this article should not be reevaluated to reflect the slightly more
relevant but still not significant impact of non-state actor support. There are two reasons why this
variable was not statistically significant. First, it seems clear that the expectation that non-state
actor support would be less important than other factors was correct, but its impact was still
overestimated. The hypothesis contends that while less impactful than other forms of support,
non-state actor support would still be statistically significant. According to the best performing
model’s results, this variable has no statistical significance and thus no impact on the dependent
variable.
The final independent variable measured was foreign state or IGO support level. Of the
“support” variables, this one was expected to return the most impactful results. While it did
indeed express a higher t-value score at [1.022] than non-state actor support or kindred support
level, it still did not achieve statistical significance. The three individual measures of foreign
state or IGO military, political, and material support were also utilized in a variety of models to
see which interactions produced statistical significance, though these variables did not achieve
significance in any of the models run. Its t-value was positive, indicating that its relationship
with the dependent variable matched what was expected—in other words, foreign state support
for a minority group increases its chances of being targeted for diversionary purposes. However,
as this variable did not reach statistical significance, the direction of the relationship between it
and the dependent variable cannot be considered as vindication of the expectation in the
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hypothesis. However, if conjecture were to be permitted, there is an intuitive causal logic behind
this result, even if it is beyond the parameters of this article to confirm these suspicions: states
with minority groups heavily influenced by foreign state actors or IGOs are more likely to target
that group as they present an accessible scapegoating narrative, while states in an economic
downturn that lack international financial benefactors are more likely to prioritize their
popularity within a domestic base.
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VI. Conclusion

The 2014 Russian invasion of the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine, The Second
Chechen War of 1999-2009, the multiple Turkish incursions into Syria as part of the ongoing
Rojava Conflict, the ongoing Rohingya Genocides in Myanmar, and even the recent war
posturing between the United States and Iran beginning in January, 2020 all have important
markers of domestic diversionary conflicts. The prevalence and scale of ongoing conflicts
worldwide demonstrates the necessity of continued research into diversionary violence. The
refined target selection model developed in this article and the new research pathways it reveals
promise deeper insight into the diversionary process. Understanding who is most likely to be
targeted by this type of violence, as well as why they are at risk is essential in predicting and
perhaps preventing or lessening the severity of diversionary tactics. More research is required
before specific policy recommendations can be extrapolated from the data analyzed here, but the
necessity of diversionary target selection as a model in the diversionary literature has been
established.
While diversionary war literature is quite broad, research into its domestic applications
has been limited. For this reason, this article opens new avenues for research into the field, based
on the opportunities provided by the wider set of potential variables surveyed in its quantitative
analysis. The variables selected were chosen based not on their relevance to past diversionary
war literature, but in the context of a real-world example of diversionary violence, commonly
referred to as the “Kurdish Question.” The variables measured were thus consistent with more
real-world observations than those present in the majority of contributions to the diversionary
war literature.
Several avenues for future research persist. Though this article lays out the conditions
under which a domestic minority group may be targeted by diversionary violence, it does not
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identify which conditions render a diversionary attempt successful. While this article evaluated
the deterrence value of foreign state support for a minority group, the impact of an outside,
influential state encouraging a diversionary attempt is also still in question. Finding evidence of
this dynamic could provide a better understanding of the deterrent value of foreign state support.
While this article exclusively analyzed the conditions that lead to diversionary violence
occurring, it seems intuitive that states would first attempt other, less expensive and destructive
diversions first. The diversionary model could benefit from analyzing the impact of cultural
suppression, restriction of voting rights, and other repressive tactics on the diversionary targeting
model. It also remains unclear why a higher level of protest correlates to a lower likelihood of
being targeted for diversionary violence. The kindred support level variable may have
underperformed because kindred support is more nuanced than expressed in this article. A deeper
analysis of competition and the outbidding process that takes place within ethnic minority groups
may shed more light on the conditions in which kindred group support is withheld during a
diversionary attempt. As described in the case of the Çiller administration, there is a lack of
clarity regarding whether a threshold exists beyond which the state considers further diversionary
violence to be a net negative given the economic damage it can wreak. Finally, with the promise
of new, more detailed data available from the familiar Minorities at Risk Database and SPEED
Civil Unrest Database in the near future, more data could certainly be extracted from this
analysis to further the understanding of the diversionary process and its domestic applications.
This article determines that the presence of recent grievances in the form of repressive
tactics used against a specific minority, higher population concentration of the minority group
population within a region, and lower levels of protest amongst the minority group increased the
chances of that minority group being targeted by the state for diversionary purposes. Other
variables, such as kindred support level, foreign state or IGO support level, and non-state actor
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support level for the minority groups were shown to have little to no effect on the state’s decision
to target a minority group in this manner.
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Appendix: Proportional Odds Logistics Regression Model Summary

> library(MASS)
> divers.data$DIV_VIOL_2005<-factor(DIV_VIOL_2005)
> model.main<polr(DIV_VIOL_2005~indexKSUP+indexNSASUP+indexSTAMATSUP+Recent.Grievan
ce+GROUPCON+PROT+ECDIS,data = divers.data)
> summary(model.main)

Re-fitting to get Hessian
Call:
polr(formula = DIV_VIOL_2005 ~ indexKSUP + indexNSASUP + indexSTAMATSUP +
Recent.Grievance + GROUPCON + PROT + ECDIS, data = divers.data)

Coefficients:
Value

Std. Error

t value

indexKSUP

0.05165

0.1896

0.2725

indexNSASUP

-0.07898

0.1492

-0.5295

indexSTAMATSUP

0.11223

0.1098

1.0222

Recent.Grievance

1.84582

0.1939

9.5201

GROUPCON

0.28635

0.1413

2.0271

PROT

-0.04054

0.0228

-1.7785

ECDIS

0.11441

0.1090

1.0496

Intercepts:
Value Std. Error t value
0|1 2.8315 0.4569

6.1973

1|2 3.8979 0.4908

7.9415

Residual Deviance: 371.6072
AIC: 389.6072
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